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CASE COMMENT: SNEPP V. UNITED STATES
FREDERICK W. WHATLEY*
January 5, 1976-A book was published in East Germany in
1968 listing the names of scores of covert Central Intelligence
Agency operatives, including that of the late Richard S. Welch,
the CIA Chief of Station in Athens, who was murdered there
last month .... William E. Colby, the Director of Central In-
telligence, has suggested along with a spokesman for President
Ford that the naming of Mr. Welch in the current edition of
Counter-Spy had been a factor contributing to his death.1
December 10, 1979-For most of its 190-year history, the U.S.
Supreme Court has worked behind Washington's most tightly
closed doors, its deliberations largely immune to the kind of
close public scrutiny visited on presidents and Congresses. But
even that last sanctuary has now been massively breached in a
new book, "The Brethren," by old Watergate hands Bob Wood-
ward and Scott Armstrong. The results are, mildly put, pro-
vocative for the Court and the nation. In two years of backstairs
reporting, the authors have assembled an unflattering group
portrait of the Justices in camera, shading votes, doing deals,
cultivating allies, nursing enmities, intriguing where reason
fails, united most visibly by their high esteem for the
Court-and their low personal and professional regard for its in-
cumbent Chief Justice .... Supreme Court clerks-honors law
graduates who serve as confidential aides for one term-did
more than talk. Some apparently handed over reams of internal
Court documents, including draft opinions and internal
memoranda charting the Court's most private affairs. . . . In-
cluded in the hemorrhage was a detailed 77-page secret study of
the Nixon tapes case prepared for Justice William J. Brennan
Jr. According to Woodward, since Brennan was appointed to the
Court in 1956, he has assigned clerks to prepare behind-the-
scenes histories of the Court's cases. Brennan keeps them locked
in his safe and intends, Woodward says, to leave them to his
grandchildren- but his Watergate chronicle found its way to
Woodward and Armstrong
*Associate, Gallagher, Sharp, Fulton, Norman & Mollison. J.D., Cleveland-
Marshall College of Law.
' N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1976, § A, at 3, col. 1.
2 NEWSWEEK, Dec. 10, 1979, at 76, 78-79.
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February 6, 1980-Phillip Agee, a former agent of the Central
Intelligence Agency, faced legal moves against him in two
Federal courts today as the Justice Department sought to block
him from publishing a second book critical of the CIA....
Government lawyers said that advertisements for the book
announced "an intention to expose hundreds of undercover CIA
employees stationed in Africa. . . ." They argued that Mr. Agee,
who is said to have already disclosed the names of about 1,000
agents, had signed a secrecy agreement before joining the agency
in 1957 and that his actions were a threat to national security. ... 'O N FEBRUARY 19, 1980, THE SUPREME COURT HANDED DOWN ITS DECISION
in the case of Snepp v. United States.' The Court based its decision
on the writs of certiorari filed by Snepp and the government. There
were no briefs or oral arguments on the merits of the case.' The above
quotes serve as more than a mere backdrop to the Snepp case. Whether
the decision was rendered out of a concern that the actions of persons
such as Mr. Agee may lead to the deaths of Central Intelligence Agency
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as CIA) operatives, such as Mr.
Welch's murder, whether it was a reaction to the breach of the Supreme
Court's confidentiality, or whether, as is most probably the case, the
decision was based upon a combination of these concerns, it is clear that
the decision did not adhere to applicable legal principles, nor did it
follow the precedents of similar cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background of the Case
Mr. Frank Snepp was an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency'
for approximately eight years. As a condition of his employment with
the CIA, Mr. Snepp, in 1968, signed a secrecy agreement. The agree-
ment basically stated that Mr. Snepp would not publish or participate in
the publication of any information or material concerning the CIA or
CIA activities without first submitting the material to the CIA for
prepublication review.' Upon his resignation in 1976, Mr. Snepp signed a
' N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1980, § A, at 17, col. 6.
Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
Petition for Rehearing, at 1, Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
The Central Intelligence Agency [hereinafter sometimes referred to as
CIA] is an integral component of the United States' national security program in
the foreign intelligence field. The CIA exists and is regulated pursuant to 50
U.S.C. §§ 401-05 (1976).
' In pertinent part, the Agreement provided as follows:
Secrecy Agreement
1. I, Frank W. Snepp, III, understand that upon entering on duty with
[Vol. 30:247
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termination agreement. In this agreement, Mr. Snepp promised, among
other things, not to publish any classified information or any informa-
tion concerning the CIA which had not been made public by the CIA.'
During his period of employment with the CIA, Mr. Snepp had easy
access to classified material.' Also during his employment, Mr. Snepp
served in Vietnam for four and one-half years."8 Subsequent to his
resignation, Mr. Snepp wrote and had published his book, Decent Inter-
val.1 He did not submit his manuscript to the CIA for prepublication ap-
proval.
In his book, Mr. Snepp was highly critical of the CIA's involvement in,
and activities relating to, the withdrawal of United States forces from
Vietnam. However, Decent Interval contained no classified material or
information relating the CIA which the CIA had not previously made
public.12 There is some question as to whether the CIA relied, prior to
the Central Intelligence Agency I am undertaking a position of trust in
that Agency of the Government responsible to the President and the Na-
tional Security Council for intelligence relating to the security of the
United States of America. I understand that in the course of my employ-
ment I will acquire information about the Agency and its activities and
about intelligence acquired or produced by the Agency.
8. Inasmuch as employment by the Government is a privilege not a
right, in consideration of my employment by CIA I undertake not to
publish or participate in the publication of any information or material
relating to the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally,
either during or after the term of my employment by the Agency
without specific prior approval by the Agency. I understand that it is
established Agency policy to refuse approval to publication of or par-
ticipation in publication of any such information or material.
United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 930 n.1 (4th Cir. 1979) (emphasis added),
aff'd, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
8 Termination of Secrecy Agreement
1. I, Frank Snepp, III, am about to terminate my association with the
Central Intelligence Agency. I realize that, by virtue of my duties with
that Agency, I have been the recipient of information and intelligence
that concern the present and future security of the United States of
America.
3. I will never divulge, publish, or reveal by writing conduct, or other-
wise any classified information, or any information concerning in-
telligence or CIA that has not been made public by CIA, to any
unauthorized person including, but not limited to, any future govern-
mental or private employer or official without the express written con-
sent of the Director of Central Intelligence or his representative.
595 F.2d at 930 n.2 (emphasis added).
Id. at 930.
10 Id.
1 F. SNEPP, DECENT INTERVAL (1977).
12 The following interrogatory was propounded by Snepp to the government
during pretrial discovery: "Do you contend that Decent Interval contains
1981]
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the publication of Decent Interval, on alleged representations by Mr.
Snepp that he would submit his manuscript for prepublication review. 3
classified information or any information concerning intelligence or CIA that has
not been made public by CIA." The Government's response was: "For the pur-
pose of this action, plaintiff does not so contend." Brief for Defendant-Appellant,
at 6, United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1979).
"S The government contended that Snepp made repeated assurances to the
CIA officials that he would submit his manuscript for prepublication review.
Brief for United States in Opposition to Petitioner Snepp's Petition for Cer-
tiorari, at 3, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
The Appellate Court found that Snepp had "represented on a number of occa-
sions that he intended to submit the manuscript to the CIA for prior approval...."
United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 930 (4th Cir. 1979). The Appellate Court
was apparently relying on the District Court's findings that Snepp had "made
assurances" or had led various CIA officials to believe that he was submitting his
manuscript for prepublication review. The Court went on to hold that Snepp had
"surreptitiously breached" his secrecy agreement. United States v. Snepp, 456 F.
Supp. 176, 179 (E.D. Va. 1978).
The Supreme Court took note of the district court's finding that Snepp had
"surreptitiously violated" his secrecy agreement. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S.
507, 508 (1980). Even a commentator on the Snepp appellate decision stated that:
He repeatedly assured CIA officials that he would abide by the secrecy
agreement and submit his text to the Agency for review prior to
publication, and apparently in reliance on these assurances the govern-
ment declined to pursue an injunction against publication. The Agency
was caught by surprise when Snepp then secretly arranged to have his
book published without prior review ...
Comment, Enforcing the CIA's Secrecy Agreement Through Postpublication
Civil Action, 32 STANFORD L. REV. 409, 410-11 (1980).
However, the testimony at trial tends to diminish the claim that Snepp was
"surreptitious" and that the CIA was "surprised" or relied upon Snepp's alleged
representations:
The Court ruled that defendant "assured, or at least lead [sic] both Ad-
miral Turner and Mr. Morrison of the CIA legal staff to believe that he
would submit his manuscripts for agency review before publication."
Not only did the Court thus make a factual finding that should have been
left to the jury, but it ignored Admiral Turner's concession on cross-
examination that defendant did not "say he was going to submit the
manuscript."
Furthermore, additional evidence indicates that the CIA did not believe
that Mr. Snepp was going to submit his manuscript. Subsequent to the
May 17 meeting, John Morrison of the CIA General Counsel's office
wrote to Mr. Snepp to demand a written assurance that the manuscript
would be submitted for review. The CIA's internal memorandum of June
8 concerning this exchange of correspondence makes clear that the
Agency was fully aware that Mr. Snepp had not promised to submit his
manuscript. Indeed, at his deposition, Admiral Turner admitted that
after he received the memorandum he was less than confident that Mr.
Snepp intended to submit to pre-publication review of his book. In fact
at the deposition Admiral Turner testified that after receiving the June
8 memorandum his attitude was, "Let us keep our fingers crossed and
[Vol. 30:247
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In any event, Mr. Snepp capitalized on the fact that his book had not
gone through prepublication review by the CIA by publicizing this fact
when marketing his book. 4
The United States sued Snepp in February of 1978. The government
alleged that he had breached his contract with the CIA and that he had
breached a fiduciary duty not to publish without prepublication ap-
proval. The government sought, among other things, money damages, a
constructive trust over Mr. Snepp's profits from his book and an injunc-
tion against any further such publications by Snepp without his first
submitting them for prepublication review. 5
In the district court, testimony as to the harm done to the CIA
because of the publication of Snepp's book came from Admiral
Stansfield Turner, Director of the CIA, and Mr. William E. Colby,
former Director of the CIA. While being able to estimate neither the
damage done to the CIA nor the amount of the unquantifiable damages
attributable to Snepp's actions, Admiral Turner did testify that there
were a number of sources who discontinued working with the CIA dur-
ing the previous six to nine months. He also testified that numerous
hope that he can't pull those 700 pages into a manuscript and get it
published." (citations omitted).
Brief for Defendant-Appellant, at 53 n.33, United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926
(4th Cir. 1979).
Furthermore, the CIA did go to the Attorney General in January of 1977 to
seek an injunction, but the Attorney General would not go forward. Reply Brief
for Defendant-Appellant, at 9 n.4, United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926 (4th Cir.
1979).
" An interesting sidelight as to what might have caused particular irritation
at the CIA is the following exchange between Admiral Turner, Director of the
CIA, and Snepp's attorney:
A. I think this is a very major problem; however, because it has so
publicly-the way the book was published was contrived to put em-
phasis on the fact it was published without authorization. That as played
up as a marketing gimmick, in my opinion, that has particularly made this
a grievous problem for us.
Q. Your testimony is, the way this book has been marketed is a factor
that has injured the CIA?
A. Because it emphasized the fact it didn't go through the clearance
process. It, therefore, helped to tear down the visible form of control
that we have in the secrecy agreement.
Q. You're testifying, the statement Mr. Snepp made, and the publicity
Random House gave it, the fact it was on 60 Minutes, those things
damaged the CIA, is that your testimony?
A. I'm saying those are some of the things that damaged the CIA, and
the way those things were done was particularly damaging.
Brief for Defendant-Appellant, at 15 n.12, United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926
(4th Cir. 1979).
"5 Brief for United States in Opposition to Petitioner Snepp's Petition for Cer-
tiorari, Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
19811
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sources had become nervous about working with the CIA or had strongly
complained about the CIA's lack of control over secrecy.6 Since Snepp's
book divulged neither classified information nor any intelligence
sources, this "drying up" of sources or nervousness of sources ap-
parently came from the perception that the CIA lacked control over
former employees.'7 Mr. Colby affirmed Admiral Turner's testimony.'8
The interest asserted by the government was that as a result of
Snepp's publication of his book without prepublication approval, the
CIA appeared to have little or no control over information disclosed by
former agents. This appearance of lack of control then caused apprehen-
sion on the part of CIA operatives or sources. Therefore, the operatives
and sources of the CIA lessened or discontinued their relationship with
CIA. As a result of this, the CIA would find it more difficult to gather
the information necessary to maintain national security. It should again
be noted that Snepp's book contained no classified information or any in-
formation about the CIA which had not been made public by the CIA.
Thus, what allegedly triggered this chain of events was not the content
of his book, but the mere fact of its publication.
The district court found that Snepp had willfully refused "to comply
with his prepublication review obligations. ."..'"I Holding that nominal
damages were "grossly inadequate as redress for Snepp's willful breach
of trust""0 and that the damage sustained by the United States due to
Snepp's actions could not be quantified, the court exercised its equity
powers and imposed a constructive trust for the benefit of the govern-
ment upon all Snepp's revenues from Decent Interval. Further, the
court enjoined Snepp from publishing any work concerning the Central
Intelligence Agency or its activities without the prepublication review
of the CIA.2
Snepp appealed his case to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.'
While affirming the district court's granting of an injuction23 the court
found the imposition of a constructive trust in the government's favor to
be inappropriate.2'
Not satisified with nominal damages alone for Snepp's breach of his
contract, although admitting that whatever damages suffered by the
1 United States v. Snepp, 456 F. Supp. 176, 179-80 (E.D. Va. 1978). The Court
concluded, prior to trial, that all material facts were undisputed, and the Court
heard the case without a jury. Id.
17 Id. at 180.
1 Id.
I0 d. at 181.
20Id.
21 Id. at 182.
' United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 934.
2 Id. at 935.
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government were not quantifiable, the court put forth the idea that
perhaps punitive damages were appropriate in this case. 5 Stating that
Snepp knew of his contractual obligation to submit his work for
prepublication review and that the government did not seek an injunc-
tion in reliance on Snepp's representations that he would submit his
manuscript for review (the CIA did go to the Attorney General to seek
an injunction, but the Attorney General refused to go forward),"6 the
court felt that a trier of fact could find that these actions constituted
deceit on Snepp's part. If so found, the Court held that punitive
damages could be assessed, as the breach of contract had implications of
a tort." Senior District Judge Walter E. Hoffman concurred in part and
dissented in part. Judge Hoffman agreed that Snepp had breached his
contract with the CIA, but felt that a constructive trust was ap-
propriate."6
The United States Supreme Court upheld the granting of the injunc-
tion." The Court, however, found punitive damages to be inappropriate
in this case. In proving the tortious conduct alluded to in the appellate
court decision as being necessary for punitive damages, the Court
feared that the government would be forced to disclose the secrets it
sought to avoid disclosing." Further, the Court found that punitive
damages were speculative and unusual and would bear no relationship
to the government's harm or Snepp's gain. 1 As the Court found that
Snepp had breached his fiduciary duty to the government, a construc-
tive trust on the proceeds on Snepp's book was granted.2
Three of the Supreme Court Justices dissented: Mr. Justice Stevens
(who wrote the dissent), Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall.
The dissenting opinion agreed that Snepp had breached his duty to turn
in his manuscript." Justice Stevens found that Snepp had not breached
any fiduciary duty, but rather a contractual duty; thus, a constructive
trust was inappropriate."
B. Background Cases
In order to fully understand the court's holdings in the Snepp deci-
Id. at 936.
As to whether government really relied on Snepp's alleged representa-
tions, see note 13 supra and accompanying text.
2 595 F.2d at 937.
28 Id. at 939-42.
Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 516 (1980).
Id. at 514. See section below on "Methods of Control" for discussion of
"Graymail."
I d.
32 Id. at 516.
3 Id.
3 Id. at 517.
1981]
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sion, two earlier cases must be looked into. The first such case is United
States v. Marchetti.
3 5
Victor Marchetti was employed by the Central Intelligence Agency
from October, 1955, until September, 1969. Marchetti, like Snepp, signed
two secrecy agreements, one upon his entry into the CIA and one upon
his termination. 6 Subsequent to his resignation, Marchetti published a
novel and several articles and had submitted an outline to the CIA of
w United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1063 (1972).
" Id. at 1312 n.1-2. The relevant sections of Marchetti's Agreements read as
follows:
Entry Agreement- Secrecy Agreement
1. I, Victor L. Marchetti, understand that by virtue of my duties in the
Central Intelligence Agency, I may be or have been the recipient of in-
formation and intelligence which concerns the present and future secur-
ity of the United States. This information and intelligence, together with
the methods of collecting and handling it, are classified according to
security standards set by the United States Government. I have read
and understand the provisions of the espionage laws, Act of June 25,
1948, as amended, concerning the disclosure of information relating to
the National Defense and I am familiar with the penalties provided for
violation thereof.
3. I do solemnly swear that I will never divulge, publish or reveal
either by word, conduct, or by any other means, any classified informa-
tion, intelligence or knowledge except in the performance of my official
duties and in accordance with the laws of the United States, unless
specifically authorized in writing, in each case, by the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence or his authorized representatives....
Termination Agreement-Secrecy Oath
I, , am about to terminate my association with the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency. I realize that, by virtue of my duties with that
Agency, I have been the recipient of information and intelligence which
concerns the present and future security of the United States of
America. I am aware that the unauthorized disclosure of such informa-
tion is prohibited by the Espionage Laws (18 USC secs. 793 and 794), and
by the National Security Act of 1947 which specifically requires the pro-
tection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure. Accordingly, I SOLEMNLY SWEAR, WITHOUT MENTAL
RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION, AND IN THE
ABSENCE OF DURESS, AS FOLLOWS:
1. I will never divulge, publish, or reveal by writing, word, conduct, or
otherwise, any information relating to the national defense and security
and particularly information of this nature relating to intelligence
sources, methods and operations, and specifically Central Intelligence
Agency operations, sources, methods, personnel fiscal data, or security
measures to anyone, including but not limited to, any future governmen-
tal or private employer, private citizen, or other Government employee
or official without the express written consent of the Director of Central
Intelligence or his authorized representative.
Id. (emphasis added).
[Vol. 30:247
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the book which he was writing about his intelligence experiences. Mar-
chetti had previously disclosed classified information and was planning
to do so again. 7
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an injunction enjoining
Marchetti from releasing any writing relating to the CIA or intelligence
without prior authorization from the Director of the CIA." However,
the Court limited the order "to the language of the secrecy agreement
Marchetti signed when he joined the Agency." 9 The Court found that
freedom of speech and the press are not absolute"° and that the govern-
ment had a right to internal secrecy in certain circumstances where
disclosure may be inconsistent with the national interest,41 but found
the agreements constitutional only insofar as they were limited to
classified information."
The second background case to Snepp is Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v.
United States.43 This case is a sequel to United States v. Marchetti and
is often referred to as Marchetti I. After finishing this book, Marchetti
and his co-author, John Marks, a former State Department employee,
turned their manuscript over to the plaintiff Knopf, Inc., who was to
publish it. Marks, like Marchetti, had also promised not to disclose
classified information acquired by him during his employment." The
plaintiff then submitted the book to the CIA for prepublication review.
After reviewing the book, the CIA initially attempted to delete 339
items. Subsequent to the filing of the suit, the CIA made several
releases of information on its own and, at the trial, the CIA was defend-
ing its deletion of 168 items. Much of the case dealt with whether the in-
formation which the CIA wanted deleted from the book was properly
classified, and how the system of classification of information utilized by
the CIA interrelated with the Freedom of Information Act. 5
As to the material the CIA deleted from the book, the court held that
in order for the CIA to delete information, the information must be
classifiable and classified.4 All that the government must show was that
' Comment, Government Secrecy Agreements and the First Amendment, 28
AM. U.L. REV. 395, 401 (1979).
' United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1311 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1063 (1972).
3 Id.
40 Id. at 1314.
41 Id. at 1315.
42 Id. at 1317.
" Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. United States, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 992 (1975).
41 Id. at 1365.
41 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
46 Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. United States, 509 F.2d 1362, 1367 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
1981]
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each deletion contained information which was required to be classified
in any way, "and which was contained in a document bearing a classifica-
tion stamp." 7
The court held that the
First Amendment is no bar against an injunction forbidding the
disclosure of classifiable information within the guidelines of the
Executive Orders when (1) the classified information was ac-
quired during the course of his employment by an employee of a
United States agency or department in which such information
is handled, and (2) its disclosure would violate a solemn agree-
ment made by the employee at the commencement of his
employment. 8
The effect of the decision in the court of appeals 9 was to uphold
almost all of the deletions made by the CIA."
II. THE CONTRACT
All of the courts in the Snepp case found that Snepp had breached his
contractual duties owed to the government, and the injunction and con-
structive trust both flowed from this finding. However, none of the
courts seriously looked at the differences between Snepp's original
agreement in 1968 and his termination agreement in 1976. In order to
understand Snepp's contractual duties, it is necessary to look at the dif-
ferences in these two agreements, and then analyze them in light of the
interrogatory propounded by Snepp to the government.
Snepp's 1968 agreement with the CIA was very broad in the defini-
tion of material covered by the agreement: "I undertake not to publish
or participate in the publication of any information or material relating
to the Agency . ..without specific prior approval by the Agency." 5'
However, the 1976 agreement was more narrow in its definition of the
material covered: "I will never divulge, publish, or reveal by writing,
work, contract, or otherwise any classified information, or any informa-
', Id. at 1368. As to what constitutes acquiring information during the course
of employment see id at 1371, wherein the court stated that if the employee was
employed at the Agency at the time the information was classified, he will be
deemed to have acquired it during the course of his employment.
4 Id. at 1370.
Id. at 1371.
10 The book, THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE, was published bet-
ween the district court decision and the decision of the appellate court, and the
168 deletions were left out of the book. Note, United States v. Marchetti and
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby: Secrecy 2; First Amendment 0, 3 HASTINGS CON-
ST. L.Q. 1073, 1081 (1976).
", United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 930 n.1 (4th Cir. 1979) (emphasis add-
ed). See note 6 supra.
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tion concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public by
CIA."52 It is obvious that the first agreement covers a great deal more
information than the second. The interrogatory propounded by Snepp
used language which exactly mirrors the language of the second agree-
ment: "Do you contend that Decent Interval contains classified informa-
tion or any information concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been
made public by CIA," and the government responded by stating that
"[flor the purposes of this action, plaintiff does not so contend."53 It is
arguable that Snepp did not breach the 1976 agreement because of the
government's seeming acquiesence on this point. One crucial issue in
analyzing these agreements ignored by all of the Snepp courts is how
the fact that Snepp did not breach his second agreement affected his
contractual relationship with the CIA. The second issue raised in deter-
mining Snepp's contractual duties to submit his material for prepublica-
tion review is the effect of the limitation placed upon such agreements
by Marchetti I. Marchetti was enjoined from publishing his material
without prepublication approval by the CIA because of his secrecy
agreements. However, the Marchetti court strictly limited these
agreements; in order for the agreements to be constitutional, they must
deal only with classified information." Therefore, the second crucial
issue becomes whether Snepp's first agreement, which purported to
deal with any information concerning the CIA, is constitutional.
The district court's reasoning with respect to these issues is highly
questionable. First, the court quoted the part of Marchetti I upholding
Marchetti's first secrecy agreement, and then stated that Snepp's 1968
agreement was sufficiently similar to Marchetti's agreement to warrant
upholding Snepp's agreement.5 This approach, however, ignores the plain
meaning of the passage from Marchetti which the court quoted because
the district court's quote starts with "that the secrecy agreement ex-
ecuted by Marchetti at the commencement of his employment .... 56
Marchetti, like Snepp, signed two secrecy agreements, and the difference
between Snepp's agreements and Marchetti's agreements was that Mar-
chetti's first agreement was narrowly drawn as to the material covered,
while his second agreement was broader in scope. In Snepp, the situation
was reversed.
In discussing Marchetti's rights, the Marchetti court differentiated
between the two agreements signed by Marchetti. The first agreement
was enforceable only because, by signing it, Marchetti did not surrender
595 F.2d at 930 n.2 (emphasis added). See note 8 supra.
See discussion at note 12 supra.
United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1313 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1063 (1972) (emphasis added).
' United States v. Snepp, 456 F. Supp. 176, 180 (E.D. Va. 1978).
50 Id.
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any first amendment rights.7 The court reached this conclusion because
the first secrecy agreement dealt only with classified information.,
However, the court went further and stated that it would decline to en-
force that part of the secrecy agreement he signed when he resigned
from the CIA which attempted to prevent disclosure of unclassified in-
formation. The court held that such a secrecy agreement would con-
travene Marchetti's first amendment rights. 9 Therefore, when the Mar-
chetti court stated that it would uphold the agreement executed by
Marchetti at the commencement of his employment, they were
specifically speaking of the more narrowly-drawn agreement. By taking
this quote from Marchetti out of context, the district court misused it to
uphold Snepp's more broadly written agreement.
Second, in one of its most confusing passages, the court intimated
that the agreements were the same: "Snepp's secrecy agreements are
clear and unambiguous.""0 The court went on to say:
[Snepp's] 1976 secrecy termination agreement is not limited to
classified information, as he would have you read it-it reads
classified information or any information concerning intelligence
of CIA that has not been made public by CIA.
Both secrecy agreements require submission of all such
material for CIA prepublication review.61
It might seem from the above quote that the court's definition of what
material must be submitted for prepublication review is defined by the
1976 agreement, but such is not the case. The court, when delineating
what Snepp has a right to publish, found that he could not communicate
any material relating to the CIA and consistently used the terminology
of the 1968 agreement. As this is the only analysis by the district court
of the differences between Snepp's two agreements, one must assume
that the court found these agreements to cover the same material, and
such a finding is clearly erroneous.
The appellate court's decision skirted the issue of whether Snepp's
1976 agreement was different from his 1968 agreement;"2 the court
found that the 1968 agreement required Snepp to submit for prepublica-
tion review any material relating to the CIA. The court rationalized this
holding by stating that Marchetti's obligation, under Marchetti I, was
enforceable only to the extent that he had to submit all of his material
relating to the CIA so that the CIA could determine what was classified
11 United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1317 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1063 (1972).
Id. at 1313, 1317.
Id. at 1317.
o United States v. Snepp, 456 F. Supp. 176, 180 (E.D. Va. 1978).
61 Id.
62 United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 932 n.3 (4th Cir. 1979).
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and therefore unpublishable18 This interpretation may come from the
fact that Marchetti had to submit all of his material for prepublication
review. Therefore, unless Marchetti was publishing a compendium of
nothing but classified material and official secrets, the prior restraint of
prepublication review necessarily reached those portions of his work
which were not classified.
This analysis ignores two important points. First, the court in Mar-
chetti I stated that the first amendment precluded prior restraints im-
posed upon government employees contractually or otherwise with
respect to information which is unclassified or officially disclosed."
What the court meant by this holding is that classified information is
not protected by the first amendment while unclassified information is
protected. Therefore, if the government were to enforce its contractu-
ally based prior restraints through an injunction, as in Marchetti's case,
or through any other judicial proceeding, the government must at least
base its claim upon a disclosure of allegedly classified information. The
government did not allege that Snepp was about to disclose classified in-
formation. In addition, Marchetti never denied that he was about to
disclose classified information. Indeed, Marchetti II upheld the deletion
of 168 items from Marchetti's book. The Snepp case is differentiated
from Marchetti I because the government admitted that there was no
classified information in Snepp's book.
The Supreme Court almost totally ignored both of these issues. While
relying on Marchetti I to uphold the terms of Snepp's agreement, the
Court completely ignored the Marchetti court's distinguishing between
Marchetti's two agreements and thereby limiting the scope of such
agreements. Further, the Court implied that the 1976 agreement was
merely a reaffirmation of Snepp's 1968 pledge. 5 Indeed, this holding was
exactly what the government contended: The two agreements were
basically the same and the 1976 agreement continued "in effect the
broad prepublication review requirements of the 1968 agreement.""
The Courts' attempts at reconciling Snepp's 1968 agreement covering
any material and the Marchetti limitation on such agreements are, at
best, nonpersuasive. The courts discriminately chose what language they
wanted from Marchetti to uphold Snepp's agreement, and conven-
iently discarded the rest. The reason is quite clear. Had the courts
followed the Marchetti decision, the government would not be able to
control persons such as Snepp and the information, albeit unclassified,
which they could disclose. The courts therefore opted for control.
" Id. at 932.
" United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1313 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1063 (1972).
" Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980).
" Brief for the United States in Opposition to Petitioner Snepp's Petition for
Certiorari, at 11 n.4, Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
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Because the courts almost totally ignored the issue that Snepp did not
breach his second agreement, a more in-depth look at this issue is
necessary. All of the Snepp courts attempted, through one method or
another, to find that the agreements covered the same material. The
district court, as noted above, apparently found these agreements to
cover the same material. The appellate court found that the language of
the 1976 agreement was "indistinguishable in its effect" from the 1968
agreement. 7 The Supreme Court, by implication, found that the 1976
agreement was a reaffirmation of the 1968 agreement.
To state that the agreements cover the same material is to ignore the
language of the agreements. The appellate court's and Supreme Court's
result, however, might be attained by reading the two agreements
together as one. Although neither court's reasoning is clear, by reading
the first agreement as a pledge not to publish "any" material without
submitting the work for prepublication review, and by reading the se-
cond agreement as merely a reaffirmation of a pledge not to divulge,
publish, or reveal classified information, these two agreements might be
read in pari materia. This tortuous reading ignores the text of the
agreement and several basic rules of contract interpretation.
The second agreement is not merely a reaffirmation of the first. As
the first agreement intimates prepublication review by saying "without
specific prior approval,"" so does the second by saying "without the ex-
press written consent of the Director ... ."" On the face of these
agreements, the obligations of Snepp to submit material for prepublica-
tion review are basically the same. What has changed is the scope of
material covered by the agreements.
The change in the material covered may change the contractual
duties Snepp had to the government. While the Uniform Commercial
Code allows modification of a contract without consideration," trying to
analogize Snepp's contract to a contract between merchants is a weak
argument. Therefore, the question of whether the original contract has
been modified, or whether the second agreement has superseded the
first, revolves around the issue of whether there was consideration for
the second agreement.
The question of consideration arises originally in the Marchetti case.
Besides holding that part of Marchetti's termination agreement unen-
forceable because it violated Marchetti's rights, the court found that the
termination agreement was void because there was no consideration.71
In that case it was true: Marchetti's first agreement covered classified
67 United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 932 (4th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 930 n.1.
69 Id. at 930 n.2.
70 U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1978).
71 United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1317 n.6 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
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information, while his second agreement added to his obligations by
covering any information." Marchetti received nothing in return for his
added obligations. In Snepp's case, the opposite is true, as Snepp receiv-
ed less obligations in his termination agreement, and the government
received something of value in return.
In order to constitute consideration, the performance or promise must
be bargained for."3 Further, "it is enough that one party manifests an in-
tention to induce the other's response and to be induced by it, and that
the other responds in accordance with the inducement."" The govern-
ment wanted Snepp to promise to take certain procedures should cer-
tain situations arise:
The CIA obtained at least three fresh promises from Mr.
Snepp under the 1976 agreement. In paragraph 5, he agreed to
notify the CIA in writing of any future action he might take to
obtain satisfaction of any monetary claims against the Agency.
He also promised to pursue any claim "in accordance with such
security advice as CIA [sic] will furnish me." Id. In paragraph 7,
he promised to report without delay any attempt by an
unauthorized person to solicit classified information. Finally, in
paragraph 8, he promised to notify the CIA of any attempt by
other branches of the Government to secure his testimony. He
further promises to advise such investigators of his secrecy com-
mitments and to request that the Government establish his
obligation to testify. 5
In return, Snepp was to receive greater latitude in what he could
publish without prepublication review." As consideration has altern-
ately been defined as a "benefit to the promisor" or a "detriment to the
promisee," or a performance or promise exchange for the promisor's
promise," Snepp's additional promises in exchange for a less restrictive
contract regarding publishing certainly was consistent because the
government had modified its legal relationship with Snepp to the
government's detriment. It is apparent that the 1976 agreement was a
contract, and it is apparent from the CIA's action that they intended the
1976 agreement to be less restrictive than the 1968 agreement.
72 See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
s RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 75(1) (Tent. Draft 1973).
' Id. at Comment b.
7 Brief for Defendant-Appellant, at 25, United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926
(4th Cir. 1979).
76 Snepp had been planning to write a book prior to his termination and had
told this to his superiors. Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant, at 9 n.4, United
States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1979).
1 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 121-22 (1963).
78 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 75(2) (Tent. Draft 1973).
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Both the 1968 agreement of Snepp and the 1969 termination agree-
ment of Marchetti covered "any material. . . ."I" The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals in 1972 held that the part of the 1969 agreement of
Marchetti's, which went beyond classified information, was an un-
constitutional encroachment of Marchetti's first amendment rights. The
termination agreement which Snepp signed has a notation in the lower
left-hand corner that indicated that this agreement had first been
printed in 1973.80 Questions which naturally arise are why the CIA had
changed its agreement, and why this change occurred immediately after
the Marchetti decision. The CIA arguably intended its agreements to be
in closer compliance with the language contained in the Marchetti case.
As there has been consideration for the second agreement, the change
in the material covered by the agreements modified Snepp's contractual
duties. If the second agreement is a modification of the first, the entire
contract, after applying all of the ordinary processes of contractual in-
terpretation, should be interpreted against the party who wrote the
contract." Further, there is ample authority for treating an employment
contract as an adhesion contract.2 The necessary prerequisities of a
classic contract of adhesion are present in Snepp's case: 1) standard-
ized form; 2) presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis; and 3) gross inequal-
ity of bargaining power. 3 While adhesion contract analysis does not
automatically invalidate a contract, a court will review the contract for
fairness and refuse to enforce those terms which are "unfair to the
stuck party."" Similarly, the court could strike down or reform only
those provisions which are deemed unfair." If the second agreement is a
modification of the first, it certainly seems unfair to enforce the provi-
sion which has been modified.
In light of the interrogatory propounded by Snepp, it is obvious that
the inconsistencies of the two contracts would not allow them to stand
together. As such, the 1976 agreement operated as a substituted con-
tract and discharges so far as the inconsistency.8 This view is also taken
by the Restatement of Contracts: "A substituted contract is one that is
itself accepted by the obligee as satisfaction of the original duty and
thereby discharges it. A common type of substituted contract is one
7 See notes 7 and 36 supra and accompanying text.
o Brief for Defendant-Appellant, at 23 n.15, United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d
926 (4th Cir. 1979).
81 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 559 (1960).
82 Id. § 559I(H) (Kaufman Supp. 1980).
Id. § 559C(A) (Kaufman Supp. 1980).
8 Id. § 559A(A) (Kaufman Supp. 1980).
Id. § 559A(D) (Kaufman Supp. 1980).
6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1296 (1962).
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that contains a term that is inconsistent with a term of an earlier con-
tract between two parties."87
The conclusion from the above analysis is that the effective contract
between Snepp and the CIA was the 1976 agreement. As such, Snepp
did not breach his contract. While it might be said that this result would
seriously compromise the CIA, or at least be perceived as a weakening
of the CIA's control over former employees, such is not the case. Even if
limited to classified information, the CIA still has the power of injunc-
tion. Indeed, after Snepp's refusal to sign various pledges regarding
prepublication review, the CIA attempted to have the Attorney General
seek an injunction.8 The government could seek an injunction under the
Marchetti case based on allegations that the work contained classified
information. This would allow for judicial review of the government's
claims prior to publication. While one would hope that the government
would use this power in good faith, this power is nevertheless there, and
this approach seems more equitable than ignoring basic contract law
and economically disadvantaging an ex-employee of the federal govern-
ment who published no harmful material.
III. WHAT INFORMATION CAN THE CIA PROTECT?
Since the Supreme Court has upheld Snepp's agreement with the CIA
and has sanctioned the utilization of prior restraints ° to control the
dissemination of information, it is important to know what information
the CIA can make subject to prior restraint and subject to complete
deletion.
The statutory basis for the CIA protecting information is extremely
vague. The government contended, and all three courts agreed, that 50
U.S.C. § 403(d)(3)"1 provided the necessary legislative authority for the
prior restraints and the employment contracts utilized by the CIA.
However, this statutory authority only vests power in the CIA director
to "be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure." 2 This is in marked contrast to an agency,
discussed below, created approximately seven years after the CIA was
created.
87 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349, Comment a (Tent. Draft No.
13, 1973).
88 See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
88 Comment, Enforcing the CIA's Secrecy Agreement Through Postpublica-
tion Civil Action, 32 STANFORD L. REv. 409, at 411 n.9 (1980). While the commen-
tator of the above article feels that an injunction would have been granted had
the government sought one, it would seem that, had Marchetti been followed,
such an injunction should not have been granted.
:0 See generally discussion at notes 112-217 infra and accompanying text.
8 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1976).
8 50 U.S.C. § 403(g) (1976).
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The authority vested in the Atomic Energy Commission by the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is quite specific. 3 The Atomic Energy Act
states: (1) the type of information to be protected by the Commission
(Restricted Data); (2) how information is to be removed from the
classification Restricted Data; (3) the Commission is authorized to
"prescribe such regulations or orders as it may deem necessary to pro-
tect Restricted Data received by any person in connection with any ac-
tivity authorized pursuant to this chapter .... ,,;" (4) anyone who will-
fully violates any of the above regulations or orders, if there is no
criminal penalty, is subject to a fine of $5,000 and/or up to two years in
jail, except that if the violation is with intent to injure the United
States, the fine may be $20,000 and/or imprisonment up to twenty years;
(5) anyone who communicates Restricted Data to anyone with the intent
to injure the United States or to "secure an advantage to any foreign
nation" is subject to a fine of not more than $20,000 and/or imprison-
ment up to life, or if the violator communicates such information "with
reason to believe such data will be utilized to injure the United States
or to secure an advantage to any foreign nation" is subject to a fine up
to $10,000 and/or imprisonment up to ten years;" (6) anyone who re-
ceived such information with the proscribed intent is subject to im-
prisonment up to life and/or a fine up to $20,000;" (7) anyone with the
proscribed intent who "tampers" with Restricted Data is subject to im-
prisonment up to life/or a fine of $20,000;"' (8) an employee or ex-
employee, who communicates data, knowing or having reason to believe
it is Restricted Data, to a person, knowing or having reason to believe
such person is not authorized to receive Restricted Data, may be fined
up to $2,500;' and (9) if, in the judgment of the Commission, someone is
about to violate any of the above statutes or regulations or orders
issued thereunder, the Attorney General may apply for an injunction to
prohibit such activity."2 Obviously, the Atomic Energy Act not only
defines the type of information controlled by the Commission, but also
" See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq. (1977), for a general overview.
- 42 U.S.C. § 2014(Y) (1977). "The term 'Restricted Data' means all data con-
cerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the produc-
tion of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the
production of energy, but shall not include data declassified or removed from the
Restricted Data category pursuant to § 2162 of this title." Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2162 (1977).
42 U.S.C. § 2201(i) (1977).
42 U.S.C. § 2273 (1977).
42 U.S.C. § 2274 (1977).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2275 (1977).
42 U.S.C. § 2276 (1977).
101 42 U.S.C. § 2277 (1977).
42 U.S.C. § 2280 (1977).
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the methods of control to be used. Such is not the case with the CIA. There
are no penalties prescribed in the legislative authority granted the CIA,
and the definition of what the Director of the CIA can protect is very
vague and therefore possibly meaningless. As such, it creates severe pro-
blems,"°3 including whether there are any limits on what information the
CIA can control.
While on its face the statutory authority for the CIA for the limita-
tion of information is only as to sources and methods of gathering infor-
mation, this is actually no limitation. Any information communicated
could reflect, however minutely, its source or method of gathering.
Since the government already has criminal penalties for disclosing
classified information,"' the question of the judicial interpretation of
what the CIA's limits are in relation to civil actions enforcing employ-
ment contracts such as Snepp's is crucial.
In Marchetti, the court cited the statutory authority of 50 U.S.C. §
403(d)(3)," 5 and then stated that Marchetti's secrecy agreement was a
reasonable means of protecting classified information from unauthorized
disclosure.' The phrase "sources and materials" includes classified in-
formation, but the Supreme Court in Snepp went even further. After
citing 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3),"°7 the Court stated that the CIA could have
acted, even without the secrecy agreement, to protect the "compelling
interests" of both the "secrecy of information important to our national
security and the appearance of confidentiality... .""' Exactly what con-
stitutes "information important to our national security" is very
unclear. What information the CIA may protect in order to maintain its
"appearance of confidentiality" is equally unclear. Obviously, the Court
has gone beyond the strict adherence to the classified information
standard which the Marchetti court used. Further, the Court added that
efforts would have to be made to delete "sensitive material" which
would lead to "harmful disclosures."'10 Trying to synthesize these vague
terms into a standard which anyone, including the Supreme Court, could
understand, is virtually impossible. In any event, the standard which
the Court has enunciated seems to be that the CIA may control sen-
sitive material in order to protect the compelling state interests of: (1)
the secrecy of information important to our national security; and (2) the
appearance of confidentiality of our intelligence agencies.
This standard will surely restrict the flow of information about our
,03 See generally discussion at notes 112-217 infra and accompanying text.
1 See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 792-99 (1977).
-0 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1976).
'16 United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1316 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1063 (1972).
7 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1976).
"o 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (emphasis added).
Id. at 513 n.8.
1981]
19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1981
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
government from those who would have access to such information.
Taken on its face, the standard allows the CIA to control a great deal of
information.
Two sections of this standard pose severe problems. The first such
section deals with what the Court refers to as "sensitive material."
While not defining this term, the Court includes unclassified as well as
classified material in the definition of this term. The Court states that
the CIA, with its broad understanding of what material may expose
classified information and confidential sources, has a better understand-
ing of what information is harmful,11 ° and this "harmful" material in-
cludes more than just classified material: "[A] former intelligence
agent's publication of unreviewed material relating to intelligence ac-
tivities can be detrimental to vital national interest even if the publish-
ed information is unclassified. 11 The second problematical section con-
cerns the appearance of confidentiality of our intelligence agencies. The
Court is stating that it is not enough that the intelligence agencies ac-
tually be secretive and protect sources and materials, but it is a compell-
ing state interest that they maintain an aura of secrecy. This ill-
considered phrase is extremely broad, and practically any utterance by
an employee or ex-employee of the CIA could theoretically put into
danger the "appearance" of confidentiality of the CIA.
By not limiting the information over which the CIA has control to
classified information, as Marchetti did, the Supreme Court has
authorized zealous bureaucrats and government officials to limit the
flow of potentially embarrassing or critical material to the public. The
standard enunciated by the Court has resolved little because there will
surely be continued litigation to ascertain the limits of what information
the CIA can control.
IV. METHODS OF CONTROL
The two most obvious methods of governmental control over the
dissemination of intelligence related materials are: 1) criminal prosecu-
tion for the unauthorized disclosure of classified information; and 2) the
enforcement of employment contracts, such as Snepp's, which call for
prepublication review by a government censor. As Snepp did not
publish any classified information, criminal prosecution was out of the
question. Therefore, to control what Snepp could publish, the courts
relied on enforcing Snepp's employment contract.
Id. at 512.
'" Id. at 511-12.
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A. The Enforcement of Snepp's Employment Contract
The district court held that because of his employment contract,
Snepp had an obligation to submit his book to the CIA for prepublica-
tion review."" To ensure that Snepp would not publish such material
without first submitting it to the CIA, the district court enjoined Snepp
from publishing any work concerning the CIA or its activities without
prepublication review.' 3
The appellate court also found that Snepp's employment contract
obliged him to submit material concerning the CIA or intelligence for
prepublication review"' and affirmed the district court's granting of an
injunction."6 Similarly, the Supreme Court held that Snepp, through his
employment contract, had pledged not to publish any information con-
cerning the CIA without prepublication review,"' and affirmed the
granting of an injunction."'
Under Marchetti, prepublication review was allowed only upon a
government allegation that a defendant intended to publish classified
material, but the Snepp decision allows for the prepublication review of
all material relating to the CIA, including nonclassified material. The
government need no longer bear the burden of alleging that the publica-
tion of classified material is imminent. Therefore, the boundaries of per-
missible prepublication review have been expanded. The Snepp decision
is sure to have a critical effect on the public's right of access to govern-
mental information. The enforcement of employment contracts requir-
ing prepublication review has become an effective tool for governmental
control over information. All employees of the CIA, National Security
Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, some offices within the Depart-
ment of Defense, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, the intelligence elements of the military services, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Treasury, the Department
of Energy, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the staff members of
the Rockefeller Commission, the Senate Select Committee to Study In-
telligence Activities and the House Select Committee on Intelligence
are required to enter into a secrecy agreement. 8 While most
agreements only contain pledges not to divulge classified material, some
of the agreements do require prepublication review."9 In reviewing the
1,2 United States v. Snepp, 456 F. Supp. 176, 180 (E.D. Va. 1978).
",3 Id. at 185.
'. United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 932 (4th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 934.
119 Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 511 (1980).
Id. at 516.
"8 Comment, Government Secrecy Agreement and the First Amendment, 28
AM. U. L. REV. 395, 395-96, n.1 and n.8 (1979) and accompanying text.
"ip Id. at 396 n.9-10 and accompanying text.
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constitutionality of Snepp's agreement, two constitutional standards
come into play. The first standard is the presumption against prior
restraints, and the second standard is that certain conditions of govern-
ment employment may infringe upon the first amendment rights of
government employees if the conditions are reasonable.
It should be understood that the term "prior restraint" has a meaning
separate and distinct from the term "subsequent punishment." The con-
cept of prior restraint deals with official government restrictions upon
expression prior to publication,"' and subsequent punishment deals with
penalties imposed after publication.' To understand the rationale for
the doctrine against prior restraint and its application to Snepp, it is in-
structive to take a brief look at the history of the doctrine.
During the course of the Eighteenth Century, subsequent to the lapse
of the English licensing laws on publication,'" freedom of the press from
licensing rose to the level of common or natural law.' Blackstone sum-
marized this as well as the dichotomy between prior restraint and
subsequent punishment in the following passage:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a
free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon
publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal mat-
ter when published. Every free man has an undoubted right to
lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this,
is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what
is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the conse-
quences of his own temerity.'
The underlying purpose of the first amendment was to preclude such
prior restraints on publication.' 5 The courts in the Snepp case studi-
ously ignored any mention of the first amendment in relation to the doc-
trine of prior restraint. As will be explained below, had the Court
chosen to apply the traditional prior restraint doctrine, the government
could not have controlled the release of information such as Snepp's. In-
stead, the Court chose the reasonableness standard relating to condi-
tions of public employment in order to allow such government control.
The employment contract, as enforced by the courts, provided that
Snepp had to turn over to the CIA any material he planned to publish
120 Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB.
648 (1955) (hereinafter cited as Emerson].
121 Id. at 648.
" The English law expired in 1695 and the laws imposed by England on the
United States had "broken down" by the second decade of the 1700's. Id. at 651.
123 Id.
121 Id. (emphasis added). See also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14
(1931).
"2 See Emerson, supra note 120, at 652. See also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697, 713 (1931).
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which in any way dealt with the CIA prior to publication. A CIA censor
would then review this material, and delete that portion of the material
which the CIA wished to be deleted. In discussing the nature of prior
restraint, Emerson states: "[Tihe clearest form of prior restraint arises
in those situations where the government limitation, expressed in
statute, regulation, or otherwise, undertakes to prevent future publica-
tion or other communication without advance approval of an executive
official." ' This is exactly the situation in Snepp. Also, the contract, like
the statute in Near v. Minnesota, "does not deal with punishments; it
provides for no punishment, except in case of contempt for violation of
the court's order, but for suppression and injunction, that is, for
restraint upon publication."'" Indeed, the remedy for the alleged breach
involved quite a bit of judicial construction. Further, the injunction
issued by the district court to enforce the contract is very similar to the
injunction issued in Near, as Snepp could be punished for contempt of
court for publishing any material relating to the CIA without
prepublication review. Therefore, the contract enforced in Snepp gave
rise to a classic prior restraint.
Emerson also discusses the more onerous elements of such a system
of prior restraint, all of which may be found in the Snepp case. The first
element is breadth, whereas the material brought under governmental
scrutiny by prior restraint is far greater than that of subsequent
punishment. 2 The prior restraint upheld by the Snepp courts included
any material relating to the CIA, whereas subsequent punishment, in
light of the current laws, would only deal with classified material. Sec-
ond, the system of prior restraint either withholds the information
altogether or creates a serious delay in publication until the issue of its
release is settled." The Marchetti case, wherein it took over three
years for final litigation regarding what could or could not be published,
is very illustrative on this point. Although the original Marchetti case
stated that thirty days should be the maximum amount of time
necessary for review by the CIA, 30 the final outcome was measured in
years, not days. Third, a system of prior restraint is much easier to im-
plement than subsequent punishment. Once material has been publ-
ished, the decisions regarding prosecution are much harder to make
than those decisions of whether to allow publication. A single
bureaucrat can institute prior restraint by a "stroke of the pen," while a
phalanx of lawyers may be necessary to prosecute." ' This point is also il-
12 See Emerson, supra note 120, at 655.
12 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
1 See Emerson, supra note 120, at 656.
1 Id. at 657.
130 United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1063 (1972).
"I' See Emerson, supra note 120, at 657.
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lustrated by Marchetti where there were originally 339 items deleted,
while only 168 were litigated.'32 Fourth, under prior restraint, ad-
ministrative regulations determine whether something shall be pub-
lished, whereas under subsequent punishment, procedural guarantees
built around criminal prosecutions prevail. 3 Fifth, subsequent punish-
ment is usually in the public forum, but prior restraint takes place
behind "a screen of informality."lu This is certainly true of the pro-
cedure for CIA review. The CIA, under Marchetti, has thirty days to
review the material itself. None of the decisions made during that time
are made publicly. Sixth, "[plerhaps the most significant feature of
systems of prior restraint is that they contain within themselves forces
which drive irresistibly toward unintelligent, over-zealous, and usually
absurd administration. '"' 31 This is also illustrated by Marchetti and the
review standards of the CIA:
Following are some of the 171 items which the CIA initially
deleted from The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence and then
agreed could be published.
"The Chilean election was scheduled for the following
September, and Allende, a declared Marxist, was one of the
principal candidates" (p. 14); "Henry Kissinger, the single most
powerful man at the 40 Committee meeting on Chile" (p. 17); "On
occasion, the agency will sponsor the training of foreign officials
at the facilities of another government agency" (p. 53); "As in-
credible as it may seem in retrospect, some of the CIA's
economic analysts (and many other officials in Washington) were
in the early 1960s still inclined to accept much of Peking's pro-
paganda as to the success of Mao's economic experiment" (p.
117); referring to a National Security Council briefing by
Richard Helms, "His otherwise flawless performance was mar-
red only by his mispronunciation of 'Malagasy' (formerly
Madagascar) when referring to the young republic" (p. 293);
"Prepared by the Pentagon's National Reconnaissance office,
the Joint Reconnaissance Schedule is always several inches
thick and filled with hundreds of pages of highly technical data
and maps" (p. 332).3'
Seventh, while an individual may be more certain as to what he may
publish under a system of prior restraint, and thereby reduce this risk
" See discussion at note 8 supra and accompanying text.
" See Emerson, supra note 120, at 657.
13 Id. at 658.
135 Id.
' Petition for Rehearing, at 9-10, n.6, Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507
(1980).
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of punishment, the societal interest in free expression far outweighs
such certainty.'37 Indeed, such a philosophy implies a timidity at ex-
pressing controversial ideas. It is obvious that Snepp preferred to take
the risk of subsequent punishment for publishing his material. Through
the enforcement of his 1968 contract and subsequent injunction, he will
not be able to take that risk. Finally, a system of prior restraint is more
readily enforceable than a system of subsequent punishment.'
In Near v. Minnesota, the Supreme Court decided a case based upon
the doctrine of prior restraint,"9 clearly stating that a system of prior
restraint was inconsistent with the first amendment, and that a system
of subsequent punishment was necessary."0 While the Court allowed
certain exceptions to this rule, the exceptions were very limited. Even
these exceptions may lead to problems because some prior restraints
have been upheld in later years. Justice Brennan has made a distinction
in the area of prior restraints which may be helpful. He delineated the
exceptions in Near into two categories. The first catagory consists of
obscene material and "incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow
by force of orderly government.' Justice Brennan categorizes these
exceptions to the rule against prior restraints as those situations in
which the speech involved is "not encompassed within the meaning of
the First Amendment.""' The second category is illustrated in Near as
the government being able to prevent "actual obstruction to its
recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or
the number and location of troops.""' In this category, the speech merits
first amendment protection and yet may be suppressed by an "over-
riding countervailing interest.'""
Some commentators have made other distinctions, for example, the
situation where "the presumption against prior restraints may be over-
come . . . where the expected loss from impeding speech in advance is
minimized by the unusual clarity of the prepublication showing of
harm." '5 In conjunction with the above, the factor of the type of speech,
i.e., commercial or political speech, will play a part.'
"I' See Emerson, supra note 120, at 659.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 652.
140 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 717 (1931).
' Id. at 716.
142 Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 590 (1976) (Brennan, J., con-
curring).
"I Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
144 Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 591 (1976) (Brennan, J., con-
curring).
"45 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-33, at 729 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as TRIBE].
1I Id. at 730-31.
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No matter which of the above standards one uses, Snepp's material
should have been protected. As Snepp did not reveal classified informa-
tion or any material not made public by the CIA, the problem of his
speech not being protected by the first amendment'47 is nonexistent.
However, even if Snepp's material fell into Justice Brennan's first
category, certain safeguards protect the first amendment rights of such
speech. In traditional prior restraint cases, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly stated that any system of prior restraint bears the heavy
burden of a presumption that it is unconstitutional.' 8 The Court, in a
typical and often cited prior restraint case dealing with obscenity, over-
turned a Rhode Island statute because it was a short cut taken by of-
ficials around the procedural process of a criminal prosecution and, as
such, constituted a prior restraint."9 The Court stated that "[any
system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a
heavy burden against its constitutional validity." ' However, the prior
restraint reached in this case did not reach the level of prior restraint in
Snepp; the "Commission" in Bantam Books would list objectionable
books and send a notice to a distributor that he was distributing "objec-
tionable" books, and the Commission had a duty to recommend prosecu-
tion to the state's attorney general of purveyors of obscenity."' While
the Commission's activities stopped distribution of the books"2 and was,
in effect, a prior restraint, the Commission's power was in no way equal
to that of the CIA in prepublication review. The distributor could con-
tinue distributing the book and risk criminal prosecution; he would,
however, be surrounded by criminal procedural safeguards should there
be a criminal prosecution. Snepp cannot publish today until he receives
approval. If certain materials are deleted, he must institute civil pro-
ceedings to challenge the deletion. Further, the Court has held that the
presumption against prior restraints is heavier than that against limita-
tions on expression imposed by criminal statutes because our society
prefers to punish those who abuse free speech "after they break the law
than to throttle them and all others beforehand."'5 8 The presumption
against prior restraints has been upheld in a number of cases wherein
the power of the censor never reached the level used in Snepp.
Within the first category set up by Justice Brennan, there are strict
The proposition that the first amendment does not protect the publication
of classified material is mentioned in United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309,
1317 (4th Cir. 1972).
"' See TRIBE, supra note 145, at §§ 12-31.
1"9 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
Id. at 70.
Id. at 61-62.
Id. at 68.
"s Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1974) (emphasis
added).
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procedural safeguards regarding prior restraints which have been
specifically done away with in situations such as Snepp's. In an obscen-
ity case dealing with the procedures of prior censorship of alleged
obscene material,"M the Supreme Court formulated the following pro-
cedural guidelines necessary for prior restraints to be constitutional.
First, the burden of proving that the material is "unprotected expres-
sion" lies solely on the censor.""5 Second, by either statute or judicial
construction, the process by which the material is to be restrained must
include a requirement that, within a specified period of time, the censor
will either allow the material to be shown or go to court to restrain its
showing.'" Third, this procedure must also assure a prompt, final
judicial determination.'57 Incredibly, even these safeguards were strip-
ped from Snepp. In Marchetti the court held that because of the nature
of the material covered and the confidentiality of the relationship under
which the information was obtained, the burden of obtaining judicial
review of the material deleted by the CIA "ought to be on Marchetti.""'
Therefore, the second and third procedural safeguards of mandatory
and prompt judicial review were denied Marchetti. While "the material
covered" in Marchetti, as noted above, was strictly limited to classified
material, in Snepp it was not so limited. Nevertheless, the courts in the
Snepp decisions apparently upheld this removal of procedural
safeguards by ignoring this facet of the decision and by alluding to Mar-
chetti with apparent favor: "[W]e recognized an obligation on the part of
the CIA to respond promptly to a request for authority to publish, and
we held that there was a right of judicial review if permission was
withheld."'15
A "right" of judicial review is certainly different from a procedure
where the "censor" must seek judicial review of his "restraint," and the
burden of proof is on the censor. Furthermore, Snepp's speech or ex-
pression was political in nature, and not obscene, and as such was en-
titled to a higher standard of protection. Moreover, the material which
the CIA can control is not limited to classified information but "sen-
sitive material" which, if disclosed, would imperil the compelling state
interests of the secrecy of information important to our national securi-
ty and the appearance of confidentiality of our intelligence agencies.'60
That there is no mandated judicial review over what the CIA may at-
tempt to delete in the name of this meaningless phrase, especially in
" Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
Id. at 58.
Id. at 58-59.
"5 Id. at 59.
' United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1317 (4th Cir. 1972).
"' United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 932 (4th Cir. 1979) (emphasis added).
' See generally discussion at notes 90-111 supra and accompanying text.
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light of what the CIA initially tried to delete from Marchetti's book,'61
leads one to suspect that there is the potential for widespread abuse by
the CIA of its censorship powers.
One could not seriously argue that Snepp's speech fell into Justice
Brennan's second category of expression protected by the first amend-
ment; this category necessarily presupposes that this speech is carried
out during a time of war.""2 Further, this category "has only been
adverted to in dictum and has never served as the basis for actually
upholding a prior restraint against the publication of constitutionally
protected materials.""' Indeed, in New York Times Co. v. United
States,'" the material published was classified "Top Secret -Sensitive"
and was obtained surreptitiously.' Further, the "unusual clarity of
harm" was present in a much greater degree in the Times case than in
Snepp. The majority of the New York Times Court felt that these
materials "would be harmful to the Nation."'" Moreover, the majority of
the Court who felt that there was a military security exception to the
rule against prior restraints, also felt that in order to override the
presumption, the damage had to be direct, immediate and irreparable."7
The damage done by Snepp was indirect and depended upon other peo-
ple's perception of the CIA. Indeed, as stated above, not only could the
government not quantify the damage, it could not even estimate how
much of this rather nebulous damage could be attributed to Snepp's ac-
tions. Notwithstanding Fourth District Court of Appeals Judge Walter
E. Hoffman's statement that Snepp's first amendment defense was
"patently frivolous,""' there are serious first amendment problems with
the Snepp decisions. While the courts in Snepp chose to ignore the
161 See note 139 supra and accompanying text.
'8' The obstruction of recruitment is taken from Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919), which was always couched in terms of the situation of war
surrounding the obstruction. As Emerson noted:
One is the exception for prior restraint necessary to military operations
in time of war. So long as this exception is confined to periods of actual
hostilities, it is perhaps not a matter of great significance. In the next
war, the issue of prior restraint is likely to be over-shadowed by other
problems. The exception could prove dangerous, however, if it is applied
to defensive or preparatory operations. In this application, it should be
strictly limited.
Emerson, supra note 120, at 670.
1" Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 591 (1975) (Brennan, J., con-
curring).
'" New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
' Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 591-92 (1975) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
'" Id. at 592.
... Id. at 593.
" United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 942 (4th Cir. 1979).
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issue, it is obvious that the enforcement of the contract utilizes a classic
prior restraint. The courts' usage of such a system is completely at odds
with the traditional doctrine of prior restraints. Moreover, the courts
have seen fit to give the most blatant examples of pornographic
material more first amendment protection than they have given Snepp's
political speech. Whether such a system of prior restraint will spread to
other government agencies remains to be seen. The Snepp decisions will
certainly curtail the public's access to information concerning their own
government.
The Court's decision in Snepp upheld the prior restraint of his
publications because the Court felt that such a prior restraint was a
"reasonable" condition of public employment. While not mentioning
their reasons in the body of their decision, the Supreme Court, in a foot-
note, found that: 1) The CIA had the right to "protect substantial
government interests by imposing reasonable restrictions on employees
activities that in other contexts might be protected by the First Amend-
ment. . . ."; 2) "IThe government has a compelling interest in protecting
both the secrecy of information important to our national security and
the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation
of our foreign intelligence service. . . ."; and 3) "[Tjhe agreement that
Snepp signed is a reasonable means for protecting this vital interest."'"
The first problem with this analysis deals directly with the dichotomy
between prior restraint and subsequent punishment, as discussed
above. Traditionally, the conditions of government employment were
dealt with on a subsequent punishment basis. After an employee had
been denied employment, terminated from employment or threatened
termination because of membership in an alleged subversive group, 7 '
failure to take a loyalty oath, 7' criticism of one's employer, 172 violation of
the Hatch Act 7 ' or because of membership in a political party, 174 the ag-
grieved party would bring suit to challenge the "punishment" he had
received. However, at no time was a prior restraint used. Not until
recently did the Supreme Court find a prior restraint to be preferrable
to subsequent punishment.
In Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, the Court held
parts of the Hatch Act were not so broad or vague as to be unconstitu-
tional. One of the reasons why the statute was not vague was that the
' Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980).
17' Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1951).
17' Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1966).
1 Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1961).
17' Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1972).
"' Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1975). While this list is not all inclusive, it does
illustrate the variety of situations which have come up in this area.
' ' Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1972).
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Civil Service Commission would rule upon challenged activities prior to
their being carried out.'78 This was a classic prior restraint, to be used to
"remove any doubt there may be as to the meaning of the law, at least
insofar as the Commission itself is concerned."'77 This offhand remark
was made with no mention of the problems of prior restraint. Subse-
quently, classic examples of prior restraint have been employed as
reasonable conditions of employment.
In Greer v. Spock,' the Supreme Court upheld a system of prior
restraint where the commander of a military base was entitled to
review political literature to be distributed by civilians on the base. 79
This case did not involve a "time, place or manner" regulation, such as
would apply to parades or labor picketing; the sole issue was the con-
tent of the literature."'0 In Brown v. Glines,"'8 the Supreme Court upheld
regulations that required members of the Air Force to obtain approval
of their commanders before circulating a petition, but this again was a
content regulation. "Thus, the regulations in both services prevent com-
manders from interfering with the circulation of any material other than
those posing a clear danger to military loyalty, discipline, or morale."'' 2
Approximately one month later, the Snepp decision was handed down,
authorizing a classic prior restraint.
Whether these three cases can be distinguished due to the fact that
two were cases involving military bases and the other case involved the
CIA is unimportant; what is important is that the Supreme Court
upheld classic systems of prior restraint with absolutely no mention of
prior restraint doctrine. Indeed, with the inclusion of the sentiments ex-
pressed in Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers"3 regarding
prior approval of governmental employees' activities, the implication is
that systems of prior review by governmental authorities of activities
or expressions of all government employees is preferred over subse-
quent punishment. It also should be noted that all of the speech so
restrained was "political" speech in which "the element of timeliness
may be important."" 4 The ability of the Supreme Court to sanction such
prior restraints without a backward glance at Near v. Minnesota and
New York Times Co. v. United States is cause for concern.
178 Id. at 580.
177 Id. As to this being one element of prior restraint see note 137 supra and
accompanying text.
424 U.S. 828 (1976).
1 Id. at 840.
18 Id. at 846.
',' Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
18 Id. at 355.
'~' See note 177 supra and accompanying text.
'u Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 182 (1968).
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The second problem in the "conditions of government employment"
analysis of the court is the reasonableness of the infringement on
Snepp's first amendment rights. Restraints on the first amendment
rights of government employees are permitted for appropriate
reasons;'85 however, the conditions attached to public employment must
be reasonable.'" Further, "significant encroachments on First Amend-
ment rights ... must survive exacting scrutiny" and cannot be upheld
"by a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest."'8 7 Also,
the state cannot restrict constitutional liberties without precise regula-
tions. 88 Finally, where actions are taken which deprive persons of their
constitutional rights, such action must be taken by the President or
Congress and cannot be delegated to a bureaucracy.'89 The meager and
vague congressional mandate of charging the Director of the Central In-
telligence Agency with "protecting intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure,"' 90 relied upon by the Court in upholding
the prior restraint in Snepp as a "reasonable condition" of public
employment, hardly meets the above standards.
Even using the standards applied by the Supreme Court, the prior
restraint of Snepp's material cannot possibly be a "reasonable
condition" of government employment. The Court has sanctioned the
use of prior restraints where traditionally subsequent punishment was
relied upon. Further, the safeguards developed through the years
relating to what the government must show and the procedure
necessary to enact legislation which infringes upon the first amendment
rights of government employees were completely ignored.
B. Criminal Prosecution
Employment contracts such as Snepp's, while an effective means of
government control over information, pose serious first amendment
problems. One option for the government is criminal prosecutions. This
is the most obvious method of governmental control over information it
wishes not to be published.
The legislature has specifically acted in this area as it relates to the
unauthorized disclosure of classified information.'"' While the Supreme
Court has never held these statutes to be unconstitutional, the ques-
1 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1975).
'" Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605, 606 (1966). See also
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
" Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1975).
8 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1975) (citing Kusper v. Pontikas, 414 U.S.
51, 59 (1973)).
's9 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 506, 507 (1958).
' 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1976).
',' 18 U.S.C. §§ 792-799 (1977).
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tions of whether the information is properly classified, whether the in-
formation should be declassified and the mandates of the Freedom of In-
formation Act in relation to classified information, have led to extensive
litigation."2 There are other troubling aspects of a criminal prosecution
which have led to a decreased usefulness of this method of control.
The first and most troubling aspect, especially in relation to the
Court's pronouncement that national security and the appearance of
confidentiality of intelligence agencies are compelling state interests, is
that criminal prosecutions are necessarily after the fact. Obviously, if
there is to be a criminal prosecution, the crime has to have been commit-
ted, and the secrets divulged. At that point, national security has been
compromised and the appearance of confidentiality either lessened or
nonexistent, depending on the nature and extent of the secrets divulged.
Criminal prosecutions are only useful to the above-mentioned compell-
ing state interests in their deterrence effect. Also, criminal prosecutions
by their nature are more difficult to maintain than a civil action to en-
force a contract. Because of the strict procedural safeguards surround-
ing a criminal prosecution and the burden of proof necessary to convict
under a criminal statute, the government faces a much greater task in
trying to prosecute a violator.
A more recent phenomenon of such criminal prosecutions is the spec-
tre of the defense using "graymail":
The term describes efforts by defendants and their lawyers to
introduce sensitive matters that may be only remotely con-
nected to their cases-secrets of just plain espionage embar-
rassments the government doesn't want to admit-in hopes of
finding something the government can't afford to disclose dur-
ing a public trial. By graymailing the government in this fashion,
the defendants have a chance for de facto immunity from pro-
secution. The process becomes a "game of chicken" between pro-
secutor and defendant says Joseph Biden (D-Del.), chairman of a
Senate intelligence subcommittee.
Biden explains, "an astute defense counsel who might repre-
sent a defendant who has leaked sensitive information, bribed
government officials, or spied for a foreign power, can threaten
the Justice Department with disclosure of classified information
in the course of the trial. He hopes that with this threat he can
force dismissal of the prosecution.' 19 3
The methods of using graymail can entail both pretrial discovery and
the use of classified or embarrassing information in a public trial. Two
cases illustrate how graymail can be an effective "defense" procedure.
" See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
193 Jenkins, Graymai4 STUDENT LAW. 18 (December, 1979).
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Puttaporn Khramkhruan was a CIA agent in Thailand. While coming
into this country to attend a seminar, Khramkhruan also brought in
twenty-five kilos of opium."' He was discovered and arrested. To effec-
tively prosecute Khramkhruan, the CIA was asked by the Justice
Department to supply a witness to refute Khramkhruan's contention
that the CIA knew of his smuggling operation and refused to
interfere.9 Because of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and
statutes and case law dealing with criminal procedure, the CIA would
have also had to turn over for inspection any documents material to the
preparation of Khramkhruan's defense, any prior statements of govern-
ment witnesses relating to the witnesses' testimony and any evidence
the government had which was favorable to Khramkhruan."' The CIA
refused to give any of this information to the Justice Department, and
the Justice Department subsequently had to dismiss the case.'97
Similarly, while Richard Helms was being investigated for his ap-
parent perjury while being questioned by the Senate Foreign Affairs
Committee, the prosecutors ran into the problem of a very embarrass-
ing public trial. 9 ' Besides the threat of introducing classified material to
prove he did not commit perjury, Helms could have defended himself by
alleging that he had been instructed to say what he did by a higher
authority. "Helms' testimony, it was reported, would be embarrassing
to former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger .... and to at least one
senator on the Foreign Relations Committee.""'9 Helms eventually
pleaded nolo contendere to a two-count misdemeanor, with the Justice
Department urging U.S. District Judge Barrington Parker not to jail
Helms."' Helms received a $2,000 fine and one year's unsupervised pro-
bation."0 ' The maximum penalty for felony perjury is a $5,000 fine and
five years in jail for each count.0 2
Currently, the Congress is in the process of passing legislation in the
graymail area. As reported by the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence on March 18, 1980, H.R. 4736 would establish special pro-
cedures relating to the use of classified material during trial." The bill
basically requires the defendant to notify the government if he intends
to use classified information in his defense, and it allows the parties to
'" Id. at 19.
195 Id.
"9Id.
Id. at 20.
"9 Id. at 18.
'9Id.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
" 38 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 861 (March 29, 1980).
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have a private adversary hearing before the judge to determine if the
information may be used in trial. In case of an adverse decision, the
government could appeal immediately. The judge could bar disclosure,
allow limited disclosure or allow all of the information to be disclosed. 4
The bill covers both classified information and "restricted data." ' The
bill also provides procedures for limited disclosure, dismissing charges,
and discovery proceedings."' Similarly, the Senate has passed "graymail
legislation;"20 7 the Senate Bill (S. 1482) is similar to the House bill, the
only difference being that the House bill has more extensive coverage
over the pretrial discovery proceedings. 8
However, even such laws providing for rather extensive in camera
proceedings have limited effectiveness. In March, 1978, the Justice
Department charged Robert Berrellez, an ex-employee of International
Telephone & Telegraph Company in Chile, of perjury in his testimony
before a Senate Subcommittee investigating the CIA's involvement in
the 1970 Chilean presidential election.0 9 In October of 1978, the govern-
ment requested a closed-court hearing regarding the Berrellez prosecu-
tion. The government dropped the prosecution on February 8, 1979.10
The interesting part of the case, however, was the closed-court hearing
in October of 1978, for in the February 24, 1979, issue of The Nation, the
following appeared:
A while ago, a bulky, brown envelope arrived at the offices of
The Nation. The envelope had no return address and there was
no explanation of who had sent it, or why. It contained sealed
transcripts of a closed-court hearing that took place in
Washington last October. The hearing was part of the perjury
prosecution of Robert Berrellez, a high I.T.T. official who was
stationed in Chile at the time of the election of Salvadore
Allende. 1'
The article went on to speculate that: "Finally, it is conceivable that
the documents were sent to The Nation as part of 'disinformation' plot
to discredit a proposed new law designed to bolster such government
prosecutions." '2 The magazine then went on to discuss and print por-
tions of the transcript, stating that "the issues raised by the material
For a definition of "restricted data," see note 94 supra.
38 Cong. Quarterly Weekly Reports 861 (March 29, 1980).
Id. at 862.
Id. at 888.
2N Id.
m9 The Black Art of Graymail, THE NATION, at 210 (February 24, 1979).
210 Id. at 210-11.
2 Id. at 193.
21 Id. at 209.
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transcend the more remote and speculative harm that might result from
their publication."2 '3
The courts have recognized the above disclosure problems. In Mar-
chetti, the Court stated that "[olne may speculate that ordinary criminal
sanctions might suffice to prevent unauthorized disclosure of such infor-
mation, but the risk of harm from disclosure is so great and the
maintenance of the confidentiality of the information so necessary that
greater and more positive assurance is warranted."""4 The district court
in Snepp quoted the above with approval."5 Further, the Supreme Court
noted the problem of graymail, not only in the context of criminal pro-
secution, but also in proving the tortious conduct necessary to sustain
an award of punitive damages. Whether this portends an expansion of
protective legislation into this area of torts remains to be seen.
Whether cases such as Snepp should be decided upon the traditional
doctrine of prior restraint with its reliance on subsequent punishment
or upon the doctrine of conditions of public employment is a critical
issue in this Article. There are many interests to be considered in a case
such as Snepp. To decide what analysis or standard to apply is, in ac-
tuality, to decide the case. The weighing of interests leads one to the
standard to apply, not how to apply the standard. The vital interest in
the operation of a democratic government "that the citizens have facts
and ideas on important issues before them," ' which is akin to a first
amendment right to "receive information and ideas," ' pushes in the
direction of applying the traditional prior restraint doctrine with its in-
herent and historical loathing of prior restraints. Once one reaches this
plateau, all of the forces of free speech, freedom of the press and the
almost insurmountable presumption against prior restraints can be mar-
shalled to strike down prepublication review in favor of subsequent
punishment. Alternatively, the obvious government interest in protect-
ing the secrets vital to national security, coupled with the fear of
graymail, pushes one to the analysis of conditions of public employment
and their reasonableness. This latter analysis downplays the first
amendment and gives the government greater latitude in how it can
control material. It would seem that the first approach is preferable. If
the pending legislation is passed on graymail, the effect of graymail will
be lessened. Further, if criminal statutes are ineffective in protecting
213 Id.
214 United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1317 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1063 (1972).
215 United States v. Snepp, 456 F. Supp. 176, 181 (E.D. Va. 1978).
218 A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 224 (1964). See also First Na-
tional Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978): "Speech concerning public
affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government." Id. at
777 n.12 (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)).
217 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972).
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national security secrets, then the statutes should be changed. To sub-
ject material such as Snepp's to the obstacles of prior restraint is too
great a price to pay for the shortcomings of the legislature.
V. DAMAGES: THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Based upon Snepp's alleged breach of contract, the Snepp courts were
hard-pressed to come up with a monetary award of damages to the
government. The reason the courts were groping about for some
measure of damages is quite clear: All of the courts realized that the
damages allegedly suffered by the government were not quantifiable. 18
A plaintiff must prove "an amount of actual harm done by the defend-
ant's breach that is measurable in terms of money" '219 in order to receive
compensatory damages. Since the government could not meet this
burden of proof, only nominal damages could be awarded,"' but all of the
courts found nominal damages to be an inadequate remedy.221 Therefore,
the courts had to become creative in formulating a monetary award.
The district court and the Supreme Court followed the same line of
reasoning by imposing a constructive trust in favor of the government
over the revenue from Snepp's book. The district court found that
Snepp held a position of trust while employed by the CIA222 and that the
publishing of his book without prepublication approval constituted a
willful breach of trust;2.3 the court then imposed the constructive trust.
The Supreme Court used the same rationale; finding that Snepp was
obligated by his agreement not to publish any material relating to the
CIA,2 the Court held that this agreement also created a fiduciary rela-
tionship between Snepp and the CIA, 5 and by publishing his book,
Snepp breached his trust and fiduciary duty.2 Accordingly, the Court
imposed the constructive trust.2 7
Justice Stevens' dissent found that Snepp's 1976 agreement was
substantially the same as his 1968 agreement,2 8 and that Snepp had
breached this agreement. Justice Stevens stated, however, that since
there was no objectionable material in the book, the CIA would have
218 United States v. Snepp, 444 U.S. 507, 514-15 (1980).
219 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1002 (1964).
Id. § 1001.
221 United States v. Snepp, 456 F. Supp. 176, 181 (E.D. Va. 1978), aff'd, 595 F.2d
926, 936 (4th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 444 U.S. 507, 514 (1980).
United States v. Snepp, 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (E.D. Va. 1978).
Id. at 181.
Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 508 (1980).
Id. at 510.
-Id.
27 Id.
I Id. at 516 n.1.
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been obliged to clear the book for publication in its entirety; therefore,
none of the gains from the book were due to the nonsubmission for
prepublication review, and a constructive trust was inappropriate."
In dealing with the issue of the appropriateness of imposing a con-
structive trust upon the revenue of Snepp's book, the majority decision
cited no authority in the body of its opinion. In discussing this remedy,
the Court only mentions the results it wishes to gain; these results
were: 1) disgorging "the benefits of [Snepp's] faithlessness; 3 2) "to
deter those who would place sensitive information at risk;" '31 and 3) pro-
viding an "equitable and effective means of protecting intelligence that
may contribute to national security." '
The Court mentioned some of its rationale in its response to Justice
Stevens' dissent.213 In particular, the Court cited certain sections of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency and Scott on Trusts. The Court cited a
section dealing with the remedies available for breach of an employment
contract:
The violation by the agent of a duty which is merely contrac-
tual does not of itself cause him to be a constructive trustee of
profits thereby made. Thus, if an agent contracts to give his full
time to the principal and commits a breach by spending part of
his time working on his own account, although subject to liabil-
ity for loss thereby caused to the principal, he is not thereby
liable for the profits made in such time if he does not use the
facilities of the employer or confidential information, and does
not act in competition with him.2
Also, the Court cited a section which states that after the termination
of the agency relationship, the agent "has a duty to account for profits
made by the sale or use of trade secrets and other confidential informa-
tion . 2.3."5 The problem, of course, is determining what is confidential
information. The comment to the above section is of some use. "Trade
secrets and other similar private information constitute assets of the
principal. 2 30 In formulating a test to determine whether certain infor-
mation was either a trade secret or a piece of confidential information,
one court has recently stated the following:
Id. at 518-23.
Id. at 515.
231 Id. at 515.
23 Id. at 516. That the Court is now concerned with protecting information
which "may contribute to the national security" is somewhat disheartening. Id.
(emphasis added).
I Id. at 515 n.11.
23 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 400, Comment c (1958) (emphasis add-
ed).
235 Id. § 396(c). See also V. SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 505 (1967).
230 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396(c), Comment (1958).
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Certain common elements can be distilled from these defini-
tions and fashioned into a workable test encompassing both con-
cepts. The elements comprising that test are: 1) the protected
matter is not generally known or readily ascertainable, 2) it pro-
vides a demonstrable competitive advantage, 3) it was gained at
expense to the employer, and 4) it is such that the employer in-
tended to keep it confidential.
It is commonly recognized that-"matters of general
knowledge within the industry may not be classified as trade
secrets or confidential information entitled to protection.""2 7
Since the CIA admitted that there was no information in Snepp's book
which the CIA had not made public, the government certainly did not in-
tend to keep it confidential and, theoretically at least, it should have
been readily ascertainable. Therefore, Snepp did not use confidential
material.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the authorities cited assume
that the information or asset used by the fiduciary is in fact the prop-
erty of the principal. Indeed, in support of their imposing a constructive
trust, the Court cited a section for the liability of the fiduciary who uses
his principal's assets.' This is crucial as Congress has spoken on this
subject as it relates to government ownership of information.
Through the Copyright Act of 1976,2k Congress has stated that
copyright protection is not afforded to "any work of the United States
Government.... "2 40 Furthermore, Congress has specifically stated that
the government has no property right in its works:
The effect of Section 105 is intended to place all works of the
United States Government, published or unpublished, in the
public domain. This means that the individual Government of-
ficial or employee who wrote the work could not secure
copyright on it or restrain its dissemination by the Government
or anyone else, but it also means that, as far as the copyright
law is concerned, the Government could not restrain the
employee or official from disseminating the work if he or she
chooses to do so. The use of the term "work of the United States
Government" does not mean that a work falling within the
definition of that term is the property of the U.S. Government."'
Cherne Industries, Inc. v. Ground & Associates, 278 N.W.2d 81, 90 (Minn.
1979) (citations omitted).
m RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 404, Comments b and d (1958).
' Title 17 U.S.C. (1977).
2.0 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1977).
241 Id. § 105. See HISTORICAL NOTE, NOTES OF COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
H.R. No. 94-1476, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS 5673.
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In a letter to Jack C. Landau, Esq., Director of The Reporters Com-
mittee for Freedom of the Press, Representative Robert W. Kastern-
meir, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the
Administration of Justice, who was a co-sponsor of the above bill, at-
tended and chaired hearings on the bill and who was chairman of the
House-Senate Conference Committee on the bill as finally passed by the
Congress,"' made the following statement regarding the Snepp case and
its relation to the Copyright Act:
The Congress, when it considered the Act, carefully studied
the question of whether the government should be permitted to
assert any proprietary interest in its own information; and to en-
force this proprietary interest through Government Copyright
by having injunctive relief and an accounting of royalties and
other equitable remedies- precisely the relief requested in this
case.
The conclusion of the Congress, as expressed in the Act and in
the voluminous legislative history, was that the principles of the
First Amendment and the 1909 Copyright Act give to the people
of this country the right to have information about their govern-
ment; and that therefore, government employees have the right
to publish information obtained during the course of govern-
ment employment free from any prior restraints or post-
publication equitable relief based on any theory of the govern-
ment ownership.
The Act makes clear that Congress was not merely neutral in
this debate but with great specificity prohibited the United
States from asserting or enforcing any proprietary interest in
government information.
Furthermore, the "contract" cause of action advanced by the
government and lower court decision-if upheld-may threaten
the Congressional prohibition against Government Copyright;
and that any agency in the government will then be free to re-
quire their employees to sign such a "contract," negating the
right given to him by the Congress to publish government infor-
mation based on government employment."'
As the information used by Snepp was neither confidential nor the prop-
erty of the United States, it is clear, both from Congressional action and
the authorities cited by the Supreme Court, that the equitable remedy
granted to the government was totally inappropriate.
24 Brief Amicus Curiae of The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
in support of Appellant, Appendix A, paragraph 1, United States v. Snepp, 595
F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1979).
242 Id. at paragraphs 4, 5 and 7.
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Another problem with the constructive trust deals with the way in
which the Court utilized it. A constructive trust has traditionally been
used as a method of restitution."' It is used to force restitution of prop-
erty or money in order to prevent unjust enrichment."4 Thus, the use of
the constructive trust is to restore to the principal the property or
revenue which should have been his. The material which Snepp used,
however, was not the property of the CIA or the United States govern-
ment. Therefore, there was nothing to restore to the CIA.
The Supreme Court used the constructive trust as a punishment and
as a deterrent. In discussing the remedy of a constructive trust, the
Court stated that without such a remedy, the government would have
no "reliable deterrent against similar breaches""2 ' and that "the remedy
is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those who would place sensitive
information at risk." 7 As such, it is an "equitable and effective means of
protecting intelligence. . ". ."" Such damages are in the nature of
punitive damages, not restitution, as deterrence is one aspect of
punitive damages."9 Indeed, none of the Court's rationale touches upon
the basic goal of a constructive trust, i e., restitution to avoid unjust
enrichment.
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, alludes to the fact that the construc-
tive trust was being used as a punitive damage measure:
In any event, to the extent that the Government seeks to
punish Snepp for the generalized harm he has caused by failing
to submit to prepublication review and to deter others from
following in his footsteps, punitive damages is, as the Court of
Appeals held, clearly the preferable remedy ". . . since a con-
structive trust depends on the concept of unjust enrichment
rather than deterrence and punishment."0
It is clear that the Court's decision utilized a constructive trust as
punishment, and as such, it was totally inappropriate.
The constructive trust imposed by the Supreme Court was an im-
proper remedy in and of itself and was improperly utilized. Further-
more, the constructive trust encounters difficulties with the first
amendment. A similar remedy was requested in a case wherein the
plaintiff commenced his action subsequent to the time allotted under the
244 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160, Comment d (1937).
21 See Hert v. Klavan, 374 A.2d 871, 873 (D.C. App. 1977); see also Ray v.
Winter, 39 Ill. App. 3d 567, 350 N.E.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1976).
24 Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 515 (1980).
247 Id. at 515.
248 Id. at 516.
21 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1077 (1964).
' Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 523 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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state statute of limitation for libel,25 and the plaintiff sued for the
money received as profit from the defendant's allegedly libelous book. 52
Such an action would fall under a longer statute of limitation for a con-
tract obligation and the action would then have been timely filed.25 The
remedy the plaintiff was seeking in that case was basically what the
government was seeking in Snepp. The Court, after reviewing the first
amendment protection afforded speech and the press, stated:
It is evident that the right to recover based upon libel has
been limited to the recovery of damages under the common law
and statutes applicable thereto. It would seem, therefore, that
the law is so well established that an innovation such as the
plaintiff seeks in this action would impose new and unnecessary
hazards upon publishers and would be contrary to the policy of
our law.'"
The sort of innovation involved in the above case is almost exactly what
the Court had to do in Snepp. As damages could not be properly ascer-
tained to support an award of compensatory damages, the court im-
posed the constructive trust. It would certainly seem that this remedy
will impose new hazards on publishers, and is contrary to our policy of
free expression.
It is instructive to look at the first amendment limitations the
Supreme Court has placed upon the damages awarded in libel cases.
Libel is somewhat analogous to the Snepp situation for two reasons.
First, as in libel cases, it was the reputation of the CIA which was harmed
by the publication of the material. The court found that the CIA had
been injured by Snepp's publication of his book because the CIA had
lost a number of sources. 5 As stated above, this loss of sources must
have been caused by the CIA's appearance of having a lack of security,
because none of Snepp's material was classified nor had any of it not
been made public by the CIA. Therefore, the actual security of the CIA
was never breached. Second, in libel cases, the damage sustained by
one's reputation is difficult to quantify, and in Snepp's case, the Court
recognized that the injury done was practically impossible to quantify.
However, in libel actions one must go much farther in proving
damages than the government went in Snepp. In order not to "inhibit
the vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms, 256 plaintiffs in
libel actions must prove actual damages and not presumed damages.
57
21 Hart v. E.R. Dutton & Co., 93 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. Oreida County 1949).
" Id. at 873-74.
Id. at 874.
" Id. at 880 (emphasis added).
I Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 512-13 (1980).
1 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
17 Id. at 349.
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While there need not be "evidence which assigns an actual dollar value
to the injury,"2 the monetary awards must be supported by competent
evidence of the injury.259 This certainly was not the case in Snepp, as the
only evidence presented concerning the injury to the CIA were the
vague statements of Admiral Stansfield Turner and William Colby. In-
deed, in their testimony, they not only admitted that the harm done was
not quantifiable, but they also admitted that they did not know how
much of this damage was done by Snepp 60
The damages awarded by the Court in Snepp were not supported by
any evidence of pecuniary loss by the CIA. As such, they bore no rela-
tionship whatsoever to the supposed harm done. The amount of
damages awarded depends entirely upon the whims of the book-buying
public. The reasons such damages were awarded without proof of
pecuniary loss were to punish Snepp and deter others from doing what
Snepp had done. Further, a civil action was instituted instead of a
criminal action because Snepp could not possibly have been convicted
under any criminal statute. " 1 The Supreme Court has spoken about the
awarding of civil damages, when proof of pecuniary loss is absent, as a
substitute for criminal prosecution, and how such civil action con-
travenes the first amendment:
What a State may not constitutionally bring about by means
of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law
of libel. The fear of damage awards under a rule such as that in-
voked by the Alabama courts have may be markedly more in-
hibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute....
Alabama, for example, has a criminal libel law which... allows
as punishment upon a conviction a fine not exceeding $500 and a
prison sentence of six months. Presumably a person charged
with violation of this statute enjoys ordinary criminal-law safe-
guards such as the requirements of an indictment and of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. The safeguards are not available to
the defendant in a civil action. The judgment awarded in this
case-without the need for any proof of actual pecuniary
loss-was one thousand times greater than the maximum fine
provided by the Alabama criminal statute, and one hundred
times greater than that provided by the Sedition Act. ...
Whether or not a newspaper can survive a succession of such
judgments, the pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those who
would give voice to public criticism is an atmosphere in which
the First Amendment freedoms cannot survive. Plainly the
Id. at 350.
259 Id.
See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
See generally discussion at notes 112-217 supra and accompanying text.
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Alabama law of civil libel is "a form of regulation that creates
hazards to protect freedoms markedly greater than those that
attend reliance upon the criminal law."2 2
It is clear that the damages awarded in Snepp will have an inhibiting af-
fect on the dissemination of information otherwise fully protected by
the first amendment.
As stated by Justice Stevens,' and noted above,'" the Supreme
Court utilized the constructive trust as a form of punitive damages. The
effect of such an award was precisely what the appellate court had in
mind when it urged that punitive damages be awarded. As the purpose
of punitive damages in Snepp's case would be to both punish and deter
others in the same situation as Snepp from taking his course of action,
the appellate court stated that the amount of punitive damages to be
awarded should be viewed not only in light of Snepp's culpability, but
also in light of his financial situation at the time of the alleged breach of
his employment contract and "when he will have realized all of the
fruits of the breach."265 Once again, such a remedy is totally at odds with
the first amendment as applied in libel cases.
The Supreme Court has held that in order to lessen the likelihood of
the punishment of expressions of unpopular views and media self-
censorship, malice must be proven to justify an award of punitive
damages in libel cases.' Therefore, the statement must be false and the
person making the libelous statement must know that the statement
was false or must make the statement with reckless disregard as to
whether it was false or not."7 In Snepp's case there can be no requisite
malice as he did not make a statement containing proscribed informa-
tion. None of his statements contained any classified information or in-
formation not made public by the CIA. Thus he could not have made the
statements with knowledge that they were classified or with reckless
disregard as to whether they were classified.
By ignoring the first amendment as it applies to damages, the
Supreme Court has afforded libelous statements more protection than
the truthful statements of Snepp. The Court punished Snepp for
publishing that which the government admitted they had already made
public, in order to deter those who would, like Snepp, publish such
2I New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277-78 (1964) (emphasis add-
ed) (footnotes and citations omitted).
See note 250 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 244-50 supra and accompanying text.
15 United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 937-38 (4th Cir. 1979).
1 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-50 (1974). See also Maheu v.
Huges Tool Co., 569 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1977), wherein a "public figure" was held to
be able to collect punitive damages once actual malice had been shown.
2 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
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material. Such "punishment" and "deterrence" is certainly not in keep-
ing with "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open .... ,
Once again, the Supreme Court in Snepp was completely in error. The
imposition of the constructive trust is not supported by the authorities
cited by the Court. Further, the constructive trust was used incorrectly
to punish and deter. Finally, by totally ignoring the first amendment
protections normally afforded speech in this nation, the Court has taken
a course of action diametrically opposed to our country's commitment
towards fostering free and full public debate.
VI. CONCLUSION
Nothing positive can be said about the Supreme Court's decision in
Snepp. By not allowing briefs or oral arguments on the merits of the
case, it is arguable that the Court demonstrated that it knew what deci-
sion it wanted to make and did not want to concern itself with legal
niceties. Indeed, it is unclear why, if the case was so clear-cut that briefs
and arguments were not needed to decide the case, the Court even
granted certiorari. As Justice Stevens noted,269 the government's cross-
petition for certiorari was only filed in order to bring the entire case
before the Court if Snepp's petition for certiorari was granted. If
Snepp's petition was to be denied by the Court, the government re-
quested that its cross-petition be denied."' As Justice Stevens pointed
out, the Court summarily dismissed Snepp's claims in a footnote. 7 ' "It is
clear that Snepp's petition would not have been granted on its own
merits." '7 Thus, it is questionable whether the Court should have even
heard this case. The majority of the Court not only had predetermined
the outcome of the case, not worrying about applicable legal principles
or stare decisis, but, apparently, they also felt that their ideas on the
issues presented in Snepp were so important they necessitated being
chiseled in the stone of constitutional law. Such notion is certainly ques-
tionable: "The Court's decision to dispose of this case summarily on the
Government's conditional cross-petition for certiorari is just as un-
precedented as its disposition of the merits.""3
What was so important about Snepp? What government interest was
so overriding that it necessitated the extraordinary action taken by the
Court? It is submitted that the first three quotes of this Article coupled
Id. at 270.
29 Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 524 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
. Id. at 507, 524.
21 Id. at 524-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
27 Id. at 525.
2 Id. at 524.
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with the fear of graymail indicate the core, if not the only, rationale of
the Court. The death of Mr. Welch and the antics of Mr. Agee il-
lustrated to the Court the fragile, life-or-death nature of the security of
the CIA. The ease with which security can be breached was dramati-
cally brought home to the Court by the publishing of The Brethren.'
The Court's reasoning for imposing the constructive trust as opposed to
punitive damages was based on two factors. First, the Court sought a
reliable deterrent. Second, the Court did not want the government to
have to bear the burden of proof necessary to sustain an award of
punitive damages, as secrets of "confidences" might have to be divulg-
ed. 5 Indeed, then-Attorney General of the United States, Griffin Bell,
had this to say about the Snepp case in 1978:
Mr. Bell, however, said today that he thought the suit was im-
portant because he had come to the conclusion that enforcement
of such contracts might be the only realistic way for the Govern-
ment to protect legitimate secrets.
The only two ways to protect them are through criminal pro-
secutions for unauthorized disclosures, or through civil suits for
breach of contract he said. "But you can't prosecute if it's much
of a secret," Mr. Bell said, "because you have to make the
secret" public in the court "to prosecute." '
These concerns against the backdrop of a volatile world atmosphere,
coupled with a growing concern as to whether the CIA is effectively do-
ing its job of collecting the intelligence necessary for national security,
provide the incentive for repressing information to protect the CIA.
Was it necessary for the Court to take this action, as it related
specifically to Frank Snepp, to protect the CIA? Was it necessary for
the Court to carve up Marchetti to extract those portions necessary to
uphold its decision, and then discard the rest? Was it necessary for the
Court to formulate a standard whereby a government censor has prac-
tically unlimited control over what an ex-employee of the CIA may
publish? Was it necessary for the Court to sanction the use of a system
of prior restraint completely at odds with historical constitutional law
principles and stripped of the procedural safeguards afforded even "kid-
die porn?" Was it necessary for the Court to say that such a system of
prior restraint was a "reasonable condition of public employment" and
yet ignore the legal principles developed to test such reasonableness?
Was it really necessary for the Court to punish Snepp for, and deter
others from, publishing information which the government admitted it
T Id. at 514-15.
2 See note 2 supra.
26 N.Y. Times, March 31, 1978, § A at 9, col. 2.
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had already made public? The answer to all of the above questions
should be "no."
As stated above, Congress is currently considering a bill to substan-
tially ease the effects of graymail. 7 While in all likelihood this bill will
not be a panacea, it will make criminal prosecutions for the disclosure of
classified information easier. Similarly, both Houses of Congress are
currently considering bills (H.R. 5615 and S. 2216) for the criminal pro-
secution of those who intentionally disclose the identity of covert
American agents. The bills provide for up to ten years in prison and
fines up to $50,000 for those with authorized access to classified infor-
mation who violate the law, and a prison sentence of up to three years
and a fine of up to $15,000 for private citizens who intentionally disclose
the identity of a covert United States agent "in effect to impair or im-
pede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States.""8 Also,
both Houses of Congress are working on a comprehensive charter for
the CIA. One would hope that the Congress would strive for the same
specificity displayed in the Atomic Energy Act. 9
While none of these bills, including the Atomic Energy Act, is perfect,
and all of the proposed bills will surely face challenges in the courts, this
is as it should be. The process of congressional debate and judicial review
would constitute a more orderly, equitable, understandable and con-
stitutional procedure for dealing with the government interest in secur-
ity than the judicial creativity evidenced in Snepp.
Furthermore, there are important countervailing interests presented
in Snepp. By its nature, the CIA is secretive. Also by its nature, the ac-
tivities and policies of the CIA are extremely important to the United
States. If the citizens of the United States are to have any voice as to
the proper activities and policies of the CIA, which they should, then it
is necessary that they receive information concerning the CIA. The
kinds of information necessary for citizens to make informed decisions
come from not only the government, but from people within the CIA
who are informed and can pass on critical information. To rely only on
the data released by the government is by definition hearing only one
side of the story. As Snepp did not divulge any classified information,
nor did he disclose any covert sources in his book, the writing of his
book was in fact a public service to the people of the United States.
The Supreme Court in Snepp fashioned "a drastic new remedy... to
enforce a species of prior restraint on a citizen's right to criticize his
government." ' This remedy and prior restraint will most assuredly go
" See notes 203-10 supra and accompanying text.
" Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports, August 2, 1980, at 2229.
.. See notes 93-102 supra and accompanying text.
' Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 526 (1980) (footnote omitted).
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beyond just Frank Snepp. As stated above, many departments and
agencies within the government require secrecy agreements. Thus, a
great deal of information concerning our government may be withheld
from the public. In the end, the real losers in the Snepp decision are the
public and our form of government:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end
of the state was to make men free to develop their faculties, and
that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail
over the arbitrary. [They believed] that the greatest menace to
freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government. They recognize the risks to which all
human institutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot
be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction;
that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagina-
tion; that fear breeds repression; that representation breeds
hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of
safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed
grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy
for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason
as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence
coerced by law-the argument of force in its worst form.
Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities,
they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly
should be guaranteed. 8'
11 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted).
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